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ABSTRACT

Expanding the Pronominal Account of Tense: A Reexamination of the
Double Access Reading in English
by
Brynne Wilkinson

Advisor: Sam Al Khatib

In this thesis I will argue that the double access reading in English is not limited to the presentunder-past construction but is instead available in the present-under-future construction as well.
Unlike the traditional present-under-past construction, however, the double access reading is not
the only available reading in the present-under-future construction. I will present data that shows
that any context which licenses the double access reading also necessarily licenses a simultaneous
reading as a result of a Sequence of Tense rule. Additional data will show that, when interpreted de
re, the embedded present tense in the present-under-future construction is constrained by the local
evaluation time such that it cannot be interpreted as strictly preceding the local evaluation time. I
will therefore propose an expansion of the pronominal account by introducing a Lower Limit
Constraint to account for this data. As suggested by Stowell (2014), additional data will provide
strong evidence for a pronominal account of tense that includes an indefinite past. Both of these
additions to the pronominal account will result in an improved account for both the semantics of
tense and for the double access reading in English.
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1 Introduction
The primary focus of this thesis is the double access reading in English which has been
discussed by numerous semanticists (Ogihara 1989, Abusch 1997, Bar-Lev 2015, Ogihara and
Sharvit 2012, Altshuler and Schwarzschild 2013b, Gennari 2003). It is often assumed that the
double access reading is limited to the present-under-past construction. In a brief description, the
double access reading in English is of interest because the embedded PRES seems to intuitively
denote an interval which includes both speech time and the time of the attitude. Conventionally,
there are two primary accounts of tense that have attempted to explain how the double access
reading arises: i) the pronominal account, which assumes tenses behave like pronouns and as such
can be licensed and anaphoric, and ii) the quantificational account, which assumes tenses behave
like quantifiers.
Both accounts of tense have different assumptions and semantics for tenses, and
consequently different systems for how the interpretation of a tense is derived. Both accounts,
however, assume that tenses can be interpreted de re and assume that such interpretations are
responsible for giving rise to the double access reading in English. Understanding these prior
accounts is vital to my proposal and so before I argue for my approach, I will present both
accounts. Specifically, I will present Abusch’s (1997) pronominal ULC-based account and BarLev’s (2015) quantificational account, as inspired by Ogihara’s (1989) quantificational account.
The primary goal of my thesis is to argue for an expanded view of the present-under-future
construction such that I will claim this construction can give rise to the double access reading. I
will present data of the English present-under-future construction which I argue can only give rise
to one of two readings: i) a simultaneous interpretation of the PRES as a result of an SOT rule, or
ii) the double access reading. The data I will present will clearly show that the embedded PRES,
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when interpreted de re, cannot intuitively be understood as falling completely before the local
evaluation time, resulting in a backward-shifted reading. The conclusion that I will advocate for on
the basis of this data, is that the local evaluation time is a lower limit for the interpretation of a
tense. Therefore, I will propose a Lower Limit Constraint, a complementary constraint to the Upper
Limit Constraint proposed by Abusch, to account for this conclusion and this data.
There are significant consequences that result from proposing a lower limit on the
interpretation of tenses, however, which namely concern the loss of the backward-shifted reading
for the past-under-past, past-under-present, and past-under-future constructions. Therefore, a
secondary goal of this thesis is to present some ellipsis data from Stowell (2014) which I believe
has some insights for how to resolve these consequences. Specifically, I will argue that this data is
evidence that an indefinite PAST in English is required, even under a pronominal account of tense.
Introducing the indefinite PAST will resolve the issues that arise from the introduction of the
Lower Limit Constraint.
The outline of this thesis, then, is as follows. In section 2, I will provide an analysis for the
description of the double access reading and the intuition behind it in an effort to dispel any
potential misconceptions regarding the reading. Given that both the pronominal account and the
quantificational rely on interpreting the embedded PRES as de re, I will include in this section a
brief discussion of the de re interpretation as well. I conclude this section by presenting Abusch’s
pronominal ULC-based account, with some notes from Heim (1994), and Bar-Lev’s
quantificational account, with some notes from Ogihara (1989). For both accounts I will discuss the
primary assumptions, semantics, motivations, and critiques.
In section 3, I will present my data involving the present-under-future construction which I
will argue can give rise to the double access reading. This will serve as motivation for the proposal
of the Lower Limit Constraint, which I will introduce as an expansion of the pronominal account. I
2

will also briefly discuss a potential counterexample from Ogihara and Sharvit (2012). Following
those discussions, in section 4 I will discuss the consequences of introducing the Lower Limit
Constraint. I will submit some data from Stowell (2014) that I believe demonstrates that even the
pronominal account should include an indefinite PAST. If accepted, this proposal will resolve the
consequences that follow from introducing the Lower Limit Constraint. I will also briefly look at
another example from Stowell which will remain problematic both for my expanded account and
for Bar-Lev’s quantificational account. I will conclude this section with an argument for why I
think my expanded pronominal account is preferable to either Abusch’s ULC account or Bar-Lev’s
quantificational account. Section 5 will offer concluding remarks and discuss future work.

3

2 Double access readings
The double access reading in English has long been a topic of debate in tense theory and as
such has been given attention by various semanticists. Most of the literature on double access
readings focuses exclusively on the double access reading as it arises in the present-under-past
construction (Ogihara 1989, Abusch 1997, Bar-Lev 2015, Ogihara and Sharvit 2012, Altshuler and
Schwarzschild 2013b). I will later argue that double access readings are found in present-underfuture constructions as well, but for now I will focus exclusively on cases where a past attitude
verb embeds a present stative or progressive.
In trying to understand why double access readings arise, theorists have proposed different
explanations. Abusch (1997), for example, argues that double access readings are the result of de re
interpretations of tense nodes combining with tense semantics. In addition, in her account the
conditions that led to the initial proposition in the embedded clause must still have some relevance
at speech time. Gennari (2003), however, disagrees and instead argues that double access readings
do not require that the conditions continue to hold at speech time. The goal of this section is
threefold, i) to first provide an accurate description of double access readings, ii) to present the
pronominal account, namely Abusch’s 1997 account, iii) to present the contrasting quantificational
account, specifically Ogihara’s 1989 and Bar-Lev’s 2015 proposals. I begin now with the first goal
of this introductory section, and in the following paragraphs, I will attempt to provide a description
of double access readings. To do so, I will examine claims from different semanticists, namely
Ogihara (1989), Abusch (1997), Gennari (2003), and Bar-Lev (2015), and provide some clarity on
the conditions that lead to double access readings.

2.1 Double access reading description
The general intuition associated with the double access reading in English is that the
4

embedded proposition is related in some way to both speech time and to the time at which the
attitude holder locates him/herself. This intuition is agreed upon by Ogihara (1989), Abusch
(1997), Gennari (2003), and Bar-Lev (2015), despite the differences in their approaches to the
semantics of double access readings. Presented below in (1) is a typical example of a double access
reading.
(1) John said that Mary is happy.
The intuition behind this sentence is that the time of Mary being happy seems to be true of an
interval that includes both the time of John’s saying and speech time. In other words, in a double
access reading, the attitude holds for an interval that extends from the time of the attitude to the
time that we the speakers call speech time. In this way, the embedded tense seems to have “access”
to both the matrix evaluation time and the local evaluation time. This access of the embedded
present to both speech time and to the attitude holder’s perceived “now” is what makes the
semantics of double access readings puzzling.
We can see, however, that this intuition is vital to the double access reading and that this
construction gives rise to the double access reading by comparing the sentences in (2a) and (2b):
(2) a. John said that Mary is pregnant.
b. #Two years ago, John said that Mary is pregnant.
The sentence in (2b) is unacceptable because it violates our understanding of the world to believe
that a pregnancy could last for two years. Which is to say, because the embedded proposition is one
that cannot be said to last for the asserted interval, the requirements for the double access reading
are not met and the sentence in (2b) is consequently odd. As I will show later, both the pronominal
account and the quantificational account have different ways of ensuring that the semantics of the
embedded tense has access to both the attitude holder’s “now” and the speech time. Before we
move to the theoretical accounts, let us say more about how the double access reading connects the
5

propositional argument of the attitude to speech time and to the perceived “now” of the attitude
holder.
It is important to note, as Ogihara and Abusch have, that double access readings do not
require factivity; that is, it would be incorrect to require that the embedded proposition be true in
the actual world at either speech time or the attitude holder’s perceived “now.” The following
example presented in (3) and adapted from Ogihara’s (1989) example (17) helps illustrate this
point.
(3) John and Bill are walking down a street and look in through a shop window.
Inside the shop is Sue.
a. John (near-sighted): Look! Mary is in the store.
b. Bill: What are you talking about? That’s Sue, not Mary.
c. John: I’m sure that’s Mary.
1 minute later, their friend Kent joins them, and Sue is still inside shopping.
d. Bill (to Kent): John said that Mary is in the store. But that’s not true. The one
in the store is Sue.
Given that Bill can still report John’s belief using a double access sentence, shown here in line
(3d), even though he knows it to be false, indicates that double access readings do not require that
the embedded proposition be true in the actual world at either the attitude time or at speech time.
Indeed, the following example adapted from Gennari’s (2003) example (11), is perhaps
better evidence for the lack of factivity associated with double access readings, given that it
bypasses the possibility of an ongoing state.
(4) Jackie told little Bill that a guardian angel is watching over him.
In her argument, Gennari uses this example to make the claim that the attitude holder is not
acquainted with any actual state that overlaps speech time and the attitude time. This leads her to
the same conclusion that the double access reading is not about the existence of an embedded state
and, therefore, is not factive. For this reason, we should be cautious of any description or account
6

of the double access reading that assumes the focus of the reading is on the ongoing embedded
state. Instead, as argued by Abusch, the double access reading may be said to concern a belief that
is about an extended time, which is denoted by the embedded tense node, and is not about
eventualities or states.
Given this conclusion, there are some important observations regarding the influence of the
interval denoted by the embedded tense and the relation the attitude holder has to both speech time
and her perceived “now.” Consider the example in (5) below:
(5) Mary and John are speaking and Mary remarks: Two weeks ago, Susanna told
me that you’re working at the zoo, but yesterday I talked to her again and she
told me otherwise.
From this example we can see, yet again, that there is no requirement for the embedded proposition
to be true in the actual world at either speech time or at the attitude time. We are offered no
indication for which of Susanna’s claims is true. In addition, while there seems to be an intuition
that the attitude holder has her belief at a time that the speakers associate with the present, this
example clearly shows that claim is not quite right. After all, in this example, we cannot conclude
which of the two beliefs Susanna actually holds at speech time.
As noted by Abusch, Ogihara, and Bar-Lev, it may be said that the attitude holder should be
said to have made a claim about how she thought the world was at her perceived now. As such, it
would be wrong to understand double access readings as “the world according to Susanna,”
assuming Susanna is our attitude holder, because in her initial claim she is not making a future
prediction, as argued by Abusch. In other words, in this example, Susanna was not claiming that
“John will work at the zoo,” rather she observed some circumstances or held some knowledge that
led her to make a claim about her “now.” As I have already noted, given that it is clear from this
example that we are unaware of which claim Susanna actually holds at speech time, another
7

refinement to bear in mind is that there is no requirement that our attitude holder keep the same
opinion over the extended interval. What can be said for certain is that the attitude holder has an
opinion about her present, and we, the speakers, consider her to have that opinion about our
present, or consider that opinion to be relevant at our present, but she does not need to share our
opinion or have a relation to our present.
We therefore have the following conditions that must be met in order to give rise to a
double access reading: i) the embedded proposition must denote an interval which includes both
the perceived “now” of the attitude holder and the attitude holder’s counterpart of speech time, ii)
this embedded proposition should not be treated as factive, iii) the attitude holder must have a
belief about an extended temporal interval and not about an existing state or eventuality, iv) the
truth conditions must not require that the attitude holder make a claim about speech time or some
future time. Consider the following sentences, which are typical examples of double access
readings, and which can be said to satisfy all the conditions I have laid out.
(6) John said that Mary is pregnant.
(7) Bill discovered that Susanna is his neighbor.
(8) Mark claimed that Julie is sick.
(9) Mary agreed that Lucy is in Paris.
I have now achieved the first of my three goals for this section. With the description of double
access readings complete, I will move onto the next two goals, namely reviewing two prominent
accounts of the semantics of double access readings in English. First, however, given that
understanding de re interpretations is vital to both the pronominal and quantificational accounts of
tense, I will pause to discuss de re interpretations.
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2.2 De re interpretations
A de re interpretation can apply to a variety of lexical items, ranging from definite
descriptions and entities to pronouns and tenses. A simple definition of a de re interpretation is that
it occurs when the target lexical item is interpreted relative to the global context rather than by the
local context (as determined by the attitude holder). In other words, the information and descriptive
content contained in the res item is important to the speakers and is not contained in the attitude
held by the attitude holder. As such, the belief held by the individual may be said to be about a
counterpart of the actual time or entity, and not about the time or entity itself. This type of
interpretation is contrasted with the de dicto interpretation, where the information and descriptive
content contained in the lexical item is part of the attitude and is relevant to the attitude holder.
Consider the sentence in (10b) below:
(10) a. Context: Bill and John are talking, and John says the following to Bill about
Mary.
b. Mary thinks my boss is a jerk.
The sentence in (10b) can be interpreted de re or it can be interpreted de dicto.
Under a de re interpretation Mary would not have a direct relationship or opinion about the
definite description “my boss”. Rather, she may have a different method of describing that
individual to herself such as “the man in line ahead of me at the coffee shop.” In this case, it is for
John that the information contained in the definite description is relevant and as such, the
expression is interpreted relative to the global context as opposed to Mary’s local context. On the
other hand, under a de dicto reading of this definite expression, Mary has a direct relationship and
belief about the definite expression. This is not to say that a de dicto reading requires that Mary
must have a fixed opinion about who specifically is represented by the expression “my boss.”
Under the de dicto interpretation, Mary may base her opinion of “my boss” purely on information
9

that John has provided her about his workplace. What matters for the de dicto interpretation,
contrary to the de re interpretation, is that the expression and information contained in the
expression is contained in the attitude held by Mary.
In the case of understanding the double access reading in English, it is the de re
interpretation of tenses that is important. A more parallel example to the potential behavior and
interpretation of tenses would be, traditionally and under the pronominal account, pronouns. Let us
consider the example below in (11) that involves a de re interpretation of a pronoun.1
(11) a. Context: To Kim, George Eliot is a terrific author. Kim believes that George
Eliot was a man, but we know that George Eliot was a woman. We
have been talking about George Eliot for some time.
b. Kim thinks that she was a terrific novelist.
c. ??Kim thinks that he was a terrific novelist.
In this example, we have an attitude holder who is mistaken about the gender and pronoun of the
individual about whom she holds an opinion. The speakers in this context, however, do not have
this mistaken information in their beliefs. The sentence in (11b) where the speakers present the
information relative to the global context, is acceptable. Sentence (11c), on the other hand, where
the information is presented relative to the local context determined by Kim, is unacceptable. This
leads to the conclusion that the features of a pronoun must be interpreted transparently, or relative
to the global context. In other words, the gender features of the pronoun must be interpreted de re.
In order for a lexical item to be interpreted de re, however, we need some way of
connecting the attitude holder from her local description to the global description of the target res.
One such way would be to assume that attitude verbs are three-point relations, that involve the
attitude holder, the res (the lexical item that is the focus of the attitude), and a property that the
attitude holder believes to hold of the res. An acquaintance relation serves to connect the res under
1

The example in (11) is adapted from lectures by Sam Al Khatib.
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consideration from the counterpart in the attitude holder’s local context to the global context. De re
interpretation makes it possible to have a transparent interpretation of the target res as well as
enable the attitude verb to directly engage with it, both compositionally and for purposes of
interpretation. In addition, it is believed that de re interpretation naturally involves movement of
the res in some manner. How this res movement is accomplished will differ depending on the
account of de re interpretation under discussion.
Now, assuming for the moment that tenses behave like pronouns, we would conclude that,
like pronouns, tenses must have associated features that are interpreted transparently. As such,
tenses have the option to be interpreted relative to the global context, or, in other words, interpreted
de re. This is an important possibility for tenses, as not only could an individual be mistaken about
a time, as Kim was mistaken about gender in the example in (11), but the use of such a mechanism
in combination with the acquaintance relation allows us to interpret and derive more complex
interpretations of tense such as the double access reading. As previously explained, the goal of de
re interpretation is to ensure that the target tense is interpreted transparently and may be accessible
to the attitude verb. As a final note, it is possible that some constraints on de re interpretations are
necessary, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, and I therefore leave this
discussion to future work.

2.3 The Pronominal account
Having completed my discussion of de re interpretations I will now move on to discussing
the different accounts of the semantics of tense and the double access reading in English. As
previously established, the two accounts I will present will be the pronominal account according to
Abusch (1997), supplemented by discussions and definitions in Heim (1994), and the
quantificational account according to Ogihara (1989) and Bar-Lev (2015). For each account I will
11

present the general semantics, along with notable assumptions and any major critiques or
consequences of the account. I will begin first with Abusch’s pronominal account.
As I noted earlier, Abusch (1997) considers double access readings to be the result of de re
interpretations combing with tense semantics. She therefore makes use of the following definitions
for the present and past tenses.
(12) a. Present = ⟦PRESi⟧g is defined iff g(i) ∘ g(0); where defined, ⟦PRESi⟧g = g(i)
b. Past = ⟦PASTi⟧g,c is defined iff g(i) < tc; where defined, ⟦PASTi⟧g,c = g(i)
For Abusch’s pronominal account, then, the present tense is required to overlap with speech time
while the past tense is required to precede the reference time which is determined by the context.
One base assumption of Abusch’s account, as evidenced by these definitions, is that tenses are
pronominal and, as such, can be both licensed and anaphoric. The definedness conditions in (12a)
and (12b) can be thought of as parallels to the gender features of person pronouns. Which is to say,
similar to the requirement that FEM/MASC features on pronouns be interpreted globally, as
opposed to locally, the PAST-ness and PRES-ness features are semantic requirements that seem to
obligatorily matter for the global context and not for the local context. Also similar to person
pronouns, a second important assumption in Abusch’s account is that tenses can be interpreted de
re, and that these interpretations lead to double access readings. As I have explained, a de re
interpretation involves an attitude holder having a belief about a counterpart of the target res, rather
than of the res itself. In order for a sentence with a de re interpretation to be interpretable, the target
res is connected to the attitude holder via an acquaintance relation and undergoes movement.
Under Abusch’s pronominal account, this movement is local such that the res can compose with
the attitude verb and can be interpreted transparently.
This is, however, not the only acquaintance relation that plays a role in Abusch’s account of
tense and double access readings. Abusch (1997) introduces a relation variable, which she refers to
12

as ‘R’, that has several attributes that enable it to perform the key function of relating a temporal
argument to its local evaluation time. Abusch considers R to be feature that is transmitted by
intensional operators, such as attitude verbs. In addition, Abusch argues that when R is transmitted
by intensional operators it creates a set of relation variables that is accessible to later tenses that are
embedded in an intensional context. This enables embedded tenses to have access to the R
provided by the matrix tense, which means the embedded tense can relate to the matrix evaluation
time. This is exactly what is needed in the case of double access readings since the embedded
PRES intuitively accesses both the matrix evaluation time and the local evaluation time. With the
matrix temporal acquaintance relation of R moving down the tree to be accessible to the embedded
PRES, the resulting interpretation of the embedded tense is influenced not only by its local
evaluation time, or the attitude holder’s “now”, but also by speech time, or the matrix evaluation
time.
However, even with these definitions of tense and these acquaintance relations, Abusch’s
account is incomplete. Under these current semantics, there is a risk of overgeneration of readings
that are intuitively unavailable. Consider the sentence in (13a), with one possible LF in (13b) and
the truth conditions in (13c).2
(13) a. Mary said that John was afraid.
b. PASTj,1 Mary believe that [λt2 PASTk,2 John be-afraid...]
c. Doxm,w*,g(j) ⊆ {⟨w', t'⟩ : ⟦John be-afraid...⟧w', R(w',t')(g(k))} as long as g(j) < g(1)
The truth conditions in (13c) say that Mary’s doxastic state consists of world-time pairs in which
the state of John being afraid holds at Mary’s counterpart of the temporal interval g(k). This is
R(w', t')(g(k)). Without further constraints, it is possible for that counterpart to be seen by Mary to
fall in her future. Intuitively, however, the sentence in (13a) cannot be used to mean that Mary said
2

I assume the following truth conditions for say: ⟦say⟧ = [λw λt λP⟨s,et⟩ λxe . Doxx,w,t ⊆ {⟨w',t'⟩ : P(w',t')}].
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that John would be afraid. In other words, (13a) can only have either a backward shifted
interpretation or a simultaneous interpretation, not a forward shifted interpretation. This becomes
clearer if we contrast the acceptability of (13a) with the nearly identical sentence in (14).
(14) Two days ago, Mary said that John was afraid (the day before/*yesterday).3
The key difference between (13a) and (14) is the inclusion of specific reference times that force
readers to interpret the time of saying as preceding the time that the attitude report is about. This
change essentially forces the sentence to have a forward shifted reading. Given the unacceptability
of (14), it should be clear that the forward shifted interpretation of (13a) is not available. However,
as I have noted, there is nothing in our current semantics that prevents this expression from being
generated (Abusch 1997). That is, there is nothing in the truth conditions presented in (13c) that
prevents Mary’s counterpart of g(k) from following g(j).
In order to prevent interpretations and sentences like (14), Abusch introduced the Upper
Limit Constraint (ULC) in 1988, further developed in her 1997 article. Abusch (1997) argues that
the future is always indeterminate and as such, the perceived now of a belief alternative must be
equated to the local evaluation time of the complement of the attitude verb. Therefore, the ULC is a
constraint that states that the local evaluation time is an upper limit for the reference of tenses. In
other words, the item in a tense node is only defined if it does not strictly follow the local
evaluation time (Abusch 1997, Heim 1994). A formulation of the ULC is presented in (15) below:
(15) The Upper Limit Constraint
The local evaluation time serves as an upper limit for the reference of tenses
such that a tense is only defined if said tense does not strictly follow its local
evaluation time.
The ULC serves to make a clear prediction in cases where a PAST-marked attitude verb embeds a
PRESENT-marked complement. Since the local evaluation time in the embedded clause is an
upper limit to the denotation of PRES, the interpretation of PRES must not strictly follow its local
3

Inspired by an example in Abusch 1997.
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evaluation time. As such, PRES must instead precede or overlap its local evaluation time.
Unfortunately, the ULC lacks independent motivation and as such, is considered stipulation. There
are a few additional criticisms of the ULC which will be addressed shortly.
Having said that, with the ULC, we are now able to capture the oddness of (14). With the
ULC active, we can see how the truth conditions of (13a), initially presented in (13c), are changed,
as presented in (16a) and (16b).4
(16) a. Doxm,w*,g(j) ⊆ {⟨w', t'⟩ : ⟦John be-afraid...⟧w', R(w',t')(g(k))} as long as g(j) < g(1)
b. ∀w∀t∀t'∀R(t ¬< R(w,t)(t'))
The truth conditions presented in (16a) are identical to those in (13c). (16b), however, is a
constraint that limits the acquaintance relation R, such that the interpretation of the counterpart of
g(k) can only overlap or precede the local evaluation time. This guarantees that the local evaluation
time is an upper limit to the interpretation of the counterpart and prevents the forward-shifted
reading as we want.

2.3.1 The Application of Abusch’s account to double access readings
With the ULC established, we now have all the necessary parts of Abusch’s account of
double access readings. Let us see how her system works. To do so, consider the sentence in (7)
from our earlier discussion of a description for double access readings.
(7) Bill discovered that Susanna is his neighbor.
I have already presented (7) as an example of a double access reading, as it satisfies all four
conditions for double access readings. Now, consider the LF in (17) for (7).
(17) PASTj,1 Bill discover that [λt2 PRESk,2 Susanna be-his-neighbor]
The use of the Abusch’s definitions of tense is straightforward. I will focus instead on emphasizing
4
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the roles of the three key parts of Abusch’s account, the de re interpretation, R, and the ULC, and
how these roles produce the expected double access reading. First, interpreting the embedded
PRES as de re permits the reader or listener to target the embedded time in order to interpret it
transparently as well as ensure the attitude verb can compose with it. Second, since each tense is
equipped with a temporal relation R that relates each tense to its local evaluation time, and because
every R is transmitted down the tree resulting in each later tense having access to a set of Rs, the
embedded tense has access to both the matrix evaluation time and its local evaluation time. As such
R is able to operate as an acquaintance relation and center the time denoted by the embedded tense
on an interval that includes both speech time and the time of the attitude.
With the tenses interpreted transparently and R providing the embedded verb with access to
both the local evaluation time and the matrix evaluation time, all that remains is ensuring the
predictions of the ULC are produced. As previously stated, the ULC predicts that the embedded
present tense must overlap not only speech time, as required by Abusch’s definition of PRES, but
also the local evaluation time. Given that the embedded proposition has access to both speech time,
or the matrix evaluation time, and the attitude holder’s now, or the local evaluation time, via the
transmission of R down the tree, the embedded PRES is constrained to denote an interval that
overlaps the speech time and the time of the attitude; because of the ULC, PRES cannot denote an
interval that strictly follows the local evaluation time of the embedded clause. As such, the
predictions of the ULC are borne out and all our conditions are satisfied resulting in the desired
double access reading. See the truth conditions of (7), presented below in (18), which detail the
results of these semantics.
(18) a. Doxb,w*,g(j) ⊆ {⟨w', t'⟩ : ⟦Susanna be-his-neighbor⟧w', R(w',t')(g(k))} as long as g(j)
< g(1) & g(k) ∘ g(1)
b. ∀w∀t∀t'∀R(t ¬< R(w,t)(t'))
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The truth conditions in (18a) say that Bill’s doxastic state consists of world-time pairs in which the
state of Susanna being his neighbor holds at his counterpart of g(k), as long as g(j) precedes the
speech time, denoted by g(1), and g(k) overlaps speech time. With the constraint in (18b), which is
identical to (16b), we also have the condition that this counterpart of g(k) must not strictly follow
the local evaluation time, denoted by t'. Now, the counterpart for g(k), in this case, could only
overlap t', since it must also overlap speech time which follows t'. The interval associated with
g(k), therefore, must denote a time that extends from t' to g(1) which captures our intuition
regarding the double access reading. I have now presented the mechanisms and semantics by which
Abusch’s account achieves the intended double access reading. The remaining discussion of
Abusch’s work will focus on the critiques and consequences of her account.

2.3.2 Consequences of Abusch and the ULC
As previously noted, there are consequences to Abusch’s account that are worth discussing.
Perhaps most importantly, the ULC remains a point of contention for many theorists because it
lacks independent motivation. Some semanticists, such as Bar-Lev (2015) argue that even with the
ULC Abusch’s proposal is too weak. He argues that constraining de re readings of tense pronouns
as Abusch would permits certain readings that are not attested. Specifically, Bar-Lev argues that,
when embedded under a universal quantification over individuals, a mixed simultaneous and
backward-shifted functional reading of a past-under-past construction is permitted under the ULCbased account. Consider the following example that he provides to make this clear:
(19) Every doctor thought Mary was pregnant.
In general, it has been established that there are two readings available for this sentence. The first is
the backward-shifted reading, such that the interpretation is every doctor thinks “Mary was
pregnant.” The second is the simultaneous reading, such that the interpretation is every doctor
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thinks “Mary is pregnant.” What should not be available is this mixed backward-shifted and
simultaneous reading such that the interpretation is some doctors think “Mary was pregnant,” and
some doctors think “Mary is pregnant.” However, this intuitively unavailable reading is what BarLev argues the ULC-based account permits.
The argument Bar-Lev makes for this criticism is as follows, under a ULC system each
doctor can have an individual time concept that relates them to the time of Mary being pregnant.
What this means is that it is possible for one doctor to have an anterior temporal interval in mind,
i.e., to have a “backward-shifted” belief, while another has their perceived present in mind, i.e.,
“simultaneous.” These distinct temporal acquaintance relations would then result in a mixed
function reading of the example in (19). Under a ULC-based account, both of these acquaintance
relationships are available and permitted because there is nothing constraining the interpretation of
past tenses.5 I have additional data that I believe also shows that the ULC-based account as
proposed by Abusch is too weak, and therefore I agree with Bar-Lev’s criticism. This is one of the
reasons I have for proposing my expanded version of the pronominal account. In addition to
resolving my data where Abusch’s account is too weak, I also believe that my account will resolve
Bar-Lev’s criticism of the pronominal account, as I will propose a restriction on the de re
interpretation of tenses that affects the interpretation of PAST. I will, however, reserve my critique
for section 3, and I will revisit how my account resolves Bar-Lev’s critique in section 4.

2.4 The Quantificational account
I have now completed two of my three goals for this section: I have established a
description of the double access reading in English, and I have provided a review of Abusch’s
pronominal account. I turn now to the quantificational account of the double access reading,
5

See Bar-Lev (2015) examples (28) and (29) pp. (197-199) for a more detailed critique.
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specifically the proposal presented by Bar-Lev (2015). Bar-Lev is motivated in proposing his
account because he seeks to resolve the issues he has with the ULC-based account as well as with
Ogihara’s (1989) original copy-based quantificational proposal. The first issue he is determined to
resolve is the removal of the ULC on the grounds that it is pure stipulation. Rather his account is
intended to naturally provide for an upper limit on the interpretation of tenses. Moreover, I briefly
mentioned his complaint that in addition to the ULC being stipulation, Bar-Lev argues that it is also
too weak of an account. He suggests that the ULC permits readings involving mixed simultaneous
and backward-shifted interpretations of an embedded past because the ULC only restricts the
future. With these motivations, Bar-Lev suggests that a quantificational view of tense is preferable
and takes Ogihara (1989) as a starting point for his account. However, Bar-Lev is also motivated to
change Ogihara’s proposal because the 1989 copy-based theory cannot account both for the
simultaneous readings of past-under-past in Hebrew as well as the double access reading in
English. It is Bar-Lev’s intention to provide an account that naturally provides for both of these
readings. Having established Bar-Lev’s motivations for his revision of the quantificational account,
I will begin discussing his general semantics and primary assumptions, followed by observations
on the consequences of his account.
Bar-Lev assumes that all tenses are quantificational, and that tenses quantify over the
property of including the local evaluation time. As such, he provides the following definitions for
the present and past tense in English.
(20) a. Present = ⟦PRES⟧(T⟨i,t⟩)(P⟨i,t⟩) = 1 iff ∃t[T(t) ∧ P(t) =1]
b. Past = ⟦PAST⟧(T⟨i,t⟩)(P⟨i,t⟩) = 1 iff ∃t[∃t'[T(t') ∧ t < t'] ∧ P(t) = 1]
Both tenses take as their first argument, T, a set of times which includes the local evaluation time.
Now, Bar-Lev’s definition of PRES in (20a) is a simple existential quantifier that says there is a
time t which falls in the interval denoted by T and the proposition, P, holds at this time t. The
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definition of PAST in (20b) is similar, but it says that there is a time, t, which must precede some
part of T, and at this time t, the given proposition holds. These definitions are distinct from prior
accounts that consider tenses quantificational, such as Ogihara (1989), where the first argument is a
time or time interval of type i. Bar-Lev is instead suggesting that the first argument should be a
predicate of times, or rather a set of times and therefore should be of type ⟨it⟩.
Bar-Lev claims two motivations for this change. The first is that nominal quantifiers are of
type ⟨et, ⟨et, t⟩⟩, which is different from Ogihara’s temporal quantifiers of type ⟨i, ⟨it, t⟩⟩. By
proposing that temporal quantifiers are instead of type ⟨it, ⟨it, t⟩⟩, Bar-Lev ensures that the type of
temporal quantifiers is more similar to that of nominal quantifiers. The second motivation for this
is that Bar-Lev’s system relies on the use of Fox’s (2002) Trace Conversion Rule on the lower
copy of the quantificational tense. I will discuss the Trace Conversion Rule and its role below, but
for now, I will note that with Ogihara’s original definitions, the semantics cannot compose because
the tense is of the wrong type for the Trace Conversion Rule. With Bar-Lev’s new definitions and
the type change for that first argument this is no longer an issue. Bar-Lev therefore is motivated by
uniformity in definitions and by the compositional requirements of his system.
In (21a) and (21b) below, are the given definitions for Bar-Lev’s temporal operator and his
argument T, respectively.
(21) a. ⟦T ⟧ = λt. λt' . t ⊆ t'
b. T = [T t1] = ⟦T ⟧(t1) = λt' . t1 ⊆ t'
With this temporal operator, Bar-Lev is able to take the local evaluation time and ensure that the
resulting interval includes it. This, in turn, allows him to capture his intended meaning of tenses,
such that they do quantify over the inclusion of the local evaluation time. Another core assumption
that should be clear from these definitions, is that Bar-Lev assumes all tenses are relative, including
the English present tense. This assumption will have consequences that I will address later.
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Like Abusch, Bar-Lev assumes that double access readings result from de re interpretation
of the tense. However, his account differs in that he assumes de re readings involve a copy-based
theory of movement. In his account, the embedded tense may be raised to matrix level, allowing
the higher copy to access the speech time, while the lower copy of the embedded tense can provide
the relative aspect. As I mentioned previously, an essential part of Bar-Lev’s account is the
adoption of Fox’s (2002) Trace Conversion Rule, which allows the lower copy of the raised tense
to be interpreted as a definite description. The Trace Conversion Rule is presented below in (22), as
it appeared in Bar-Lev.
(22) Trace Conversion Rule
a. Variable Insertion (VI): (Det) Pred → (Det) [Pred λy(y = x)]
b. Determiner Replacement (DR): (Det) [Pred λy(y = x)] → the [Pred λy(y =
x)]
One final notable assumption of Bar-Lev’s account is that two copies of the same tense can have
two different binders. This is crucial to the proposal, as in order for the embedded present tense to
be interpreted as both indexical and relative in this system, the higher copy of the embedded PRES
must be bound by the matrix evaluation time, while the lower copy is bound by the local evaluation
time.
This use of the lower copy to access the local evaluation time and permit a relative
interpretation of the embedded tense leads to an important intuition for Bar-Lev’s account. This
intuition is that the interpretation of de re tenses must include the attitude time. He refers to this
intuition as the Inclusion Generalization, here presented in (23):
(23) Inclusion Generalization
A de re tense is interpreted as including the local evaluation time of its base
position (AT).
For Bar-Lev, this prediction follows from the assumption that tenses are relative and as such are
required to make reference to their local evaluation time. This is an intuition that he assumes is true
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of all tenses interpreted de re including PAST. His generalization here is also partially influenced
by his assumption that tenses are quantifiers that quantify over the property of including the local
evaluation time. Although this generalization is not a motivation for his account, it is an intuition
that he argues his account predicts. The intuition present in this generalization will be referenced
later, when I discuss additional motivation for my own account. For now, I simply want to note that
Bar-Lev and I share the intuition that all embedded de re tenses are influenced by the local
evaluation time.

2.4.1 Application of Bar-Lev’s account to double access readings
I will now provide a brief explanation for how the different aspects of Bar-Lev’s proposal
combine together to account for the double access reading. Consider (7) once again, with the LF in
(24):
(7) Bill discovered that Susanna is his neighbor.
(24) λw1 λt1 [PAST [T t1]] λt2 Bill discoverw1,t2 λw2 λt3 [PRES [T t3]] λt4 Susanna
be-his-neighborw2,t4
Now, under Bar-Lev’s account, in order for the sentence to be interpreted de re, the embedded
PRES must undergo quantifier raising. The lower copy of the embedded present will then have the
trace conversion rule applied to it, such that it can be interpreted as a definite description. The
effects of these steps on the LF are presented below in (25).
(25) λw1 λt1 [PRES [T t1]] λt7 [PAST [T t1]] λt2 Bill discoverw1,t2 λw2 λt3 [the [[T
t3] λy y = t7]] λt4 Susanna be-his-neighborw2,t4
(25) essentially says, that the proposition discovered by Bill is that Susanna is his neighbor at the
temporal interval, ⟦the [[T

t3] λy y = t7]⟧. This interval, in turn, is t7, provided that it overlaps

with Bill’s perceived present. t7 itself is bound higher than the attitude verb, specifically by PRES.
22

The result, then, is that the time that binds t4 (on “be-his-neighbor”) will be required to include, and
have access to, both current speech time and Bill’s perceived present. We see this borne out in the
truth conditions presented in (26) when we factor in the actual world and speech time.
(26) = ∃t'[t* ⊆ t' ∧ [∃t''[∃t'''[t* ⊆ t''' ∧ t'' < t'''] ∧ ∀⟨w,t⟩ ∈ DoxB(w*, t') : Susanna
be-his-neighbor in w at t'''' s.t. t'''' ⊆ t ∧ t''''= t']]]]
Briefly, the truth conditions in (26) say that the state of Susanna being Bill’s neighbor is true at a
time which necessarily overlaps Bill’s perceived present, denoted by t, and which is equal to t', an
interval that includes speech time. Thus, Bar-Lev is able to account for the double access reading in
English by using quantifier raising and a trace conversion rule assuming a system of de re that
involves a copy-based theory of movement. There are, however, a few consequences of Bar-Lev’s
account that I will now address.

2.4.2 Consequences of Bar-Lev
One benefit of Bar-Lev’s quantificational account is that it rids us of having to stipulate the
ULC. Nor would he need to propose a Lower Limit Constraint, which I believe is necessary, as
such a constraint follows on his account as well. Although he does not explore how it would fit in
his system, it is worth observing that his account still requires the use of an acquaintance relation in
order to prevent the semantics from suggesting that the attitude holder has a belief about speech
time. In his final section Bar-Lev himself notes couple of concerns regarding his system, including
one regarding his definition of PAST, as his definition renders it a non-conservative quantifier.
Another concern is his assumption that two copies of the same tense can have two different
binders. Bar-Lev observes that this is a questionable assumption and proposes that one would need
to determine if this use of multiple binders is found in the nominal domain. For a further discussion
of these points see Bar-Lev’s concluding remarks (p. 201).
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I will now turn to another important consequence of Bar-Lev’s account that concerns the
behavior of the embedded PRES. Following Ogihara (1989), Bar-Lev assumes that a de re
interpretation of tenses necessarily involves the copy-based theory of movement and that a double
access reading requires de re interpretation by scope-taking. As such, given that the present-underpast construction can only be interpreted as a double access reading, it must also therefore involve
a de re interpretation. The concern that results from these assumptions is that Bar-Lev is essentially
stipulating that in order for the embedded PRES to have access to both the matrix evaluation time
and the local evaluation time, and to therefore be interpretable, it must undergo quantifier raising to
matrix position. This is distinct from other cases of necessary quantifier raising, as those typically
result from a type-mismatch, whereas here, Bar-Lev is stipulating this movement on the basis of
lexical interpretation, which is not previously attested.
This concern is serious, because nothing in the semantics, aside from this stipulation that
the PRES must raise, rules out LFs where the embedded PRES is interpreted below the attitude
verb. If that were case, and PRES could be interpreted without undergoing quantifier raising, we
would expect the English PRES to allow relative readings. This prediction, however, is not borne
out in English data. We are therefore left to stipulate that the English PRES must undergo
quantifier raising in the present-under-past construction in order to account for the lack of relative
interpretations of the English present in this construction. This stipulation has the additional
consequence of eliminating the uniformity between the PRES and PAST. As while the English
PRES must undergo quantifier raising to be interpreted at the matrix level, the English PAST does
not share this requirement. Contrary to the embedded PRES in present-under-past constructions,
there is evidence that the embedded PAST, in a past-under-past construction, does have a relative
interpretation available. We are consequently left with the observation that while the tenses may
appear to have uniform definitions under this quantificational account, in truth the account differs
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in how tense morphemes take scope.
In his presentation of this account, Bar-Lev briefly notes in footnote 2 (p. 187) that he will
not discuss why the present-under-past is only available with a de re interpretation that results in
the double access reading. He simply assumes that the double access reading necessarily involves
de re interpretation, and de re interpretation is accomplished by movement of the target res to the
matrix level. However, it is not the case that every account of de re interpretation involves
movement of the target res to the matrix level. In some accounts of de re movement, as we saw
before in Abusch’s account, the res item is moved locally so it can be accessed by an intensional
operator.6 Additionally, some accounts, like Percus and Sauerland (2003) and Sharvit (2021),
propose systems that capture de re interpretations without any movement through the use of
concept generators. It is therefore not the case that res movement alone is motivation for requiring
that the embedded PRES undergo quantifier raising. Without this independent motivation from res
movement and without a type mismatch that would require the English PRES to undergo quantifier
raising, we are left only to stipulate that it must raise in order to be interpreted.
I have now presented a description and reviewed the two primary accounts for the
semantics of the double access reading in English. With these tasks completed I will turn my
attention to the primary goal of this thesis, which is to argue for the expansion of the double access
reading in English to include the present-under-future construction, and to further develop the
pronominal account to provide for this expansion.

6

See Heim (1994) for notes on this type of res movement (p. 154 and footnote 25).
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3 Future Double Access Readings
Recall my note at the end of the discussion of the pronominal account, where I suggested
that a pronominal account of tense with only the ULC is not sufficient to restrict all unattested
readings. My primary source for the claim that the ULC alone is insufficient is English data
involving the present-under-future construction. The data I will present will show that there are
only two possible readings of the present-under-future construction: i) a Sequence of Tense (SOT)
reading such that the embedded present is interpreted as simultaneous with the future attitude verb,
ii) the double access reading. What I argue is not available, is a de re interpretation of the
embedded present such that it is interpreted as past from the future attitude time. In order to
account for this data, I will propose a complementary constraint to the ULC, which I will call the
Lower Limit Constraint (LLC). Following this discussion, I will demonstrate the application of the
new pronominal account and will offer brief comments on data from Ogihara and Sharvit (2012).

3.1 The Present-under-future construction
As I remarked earlier, the literature on tense theory and double access readings focus almost
exclusively on the present-under-past construction (Ogihara 1989, Ogihara and Sharvit 2012, BarLev 2015, and Altshuler and Schwarzschild 2013b). A notable exception is Gennari (2003), who
does discuss the present-under-future construction as a potential source for double access readings.
Ogihara and Sharvit (2012) notably disagree and argue that the backward-shifted de re reading is
available. I will comment on their data later on in this section.
I would argue, however, in agreement with Gennari (2003), that present-under-future
constructions do give rise to a double access interpretation as well. Now, proving the double access
reading in the case of the present-under-future construction is slightly more complicated than in the
case of present-under-past because English present-under-future constructions permit an additional
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SOT reading, while present-under-past constructions do not. In other words, the double access
reading cannot be isolated from the SOT simultaneous reading in the present-under-future
construction because any context which tolerates a double access reading necessarily tolerates an
SOT reading.
Nevertheless, double access effects in the present-under-future construction can be
demonstrated: the relevant examples must be designed so that the SOT-reading is unavailable. This
target reading, then, is one where the relevant (future) attitude is not about the attitude holder’s
perceived now, but about their counterpart of our present. In ordinary circumstances this makes the
attitude “backward-shifted”, because if the attitude holder’s view of time is like ours, their
counterpart (in the future) of our present is anterior to their perceived present. However, this
reading seems to be generally unavailable, as the following examples show:
(27) #After Mary dies, John will discover that she loves him.
(28) #After she moves, Bill will finally learn that Susanna is his next-door neighbor.
(29) ?In twenty years, historians will report that Joe Biden is president in 2022.
(30) (a) Context: John has been plotting to murder Bill for a while now. Tonight,
John will go through with his plan. A key part of his plan involves Bill
visiting and being killed at Mary’s house, such that the police will think
Mary is involved in Bill’s murder. A description of the context follows in
(b).
(b) #After Bill has been found murdered, the police will say that Bill is at
Mary’s house (the night of the murder).
(31) (a) Context: Today is Susanna’s birthday and she’s just turned 33. John, Bill,
and Mary are all at Susanna’s party. Mary and John are talking, and John
mentions that he’s not sure how old Bill is. The two speculate briefly and
then change subjects. In two months, Mary and John are talking again, and
Mary reveals that she asked Susanna about Bill’s age and Susanna told her
that Bill was 31 at the time of her party but recently celebrated his 32nd
birthday. A report of this context follows in (b).
(b) #Two months after the party, John will discover that Bill is 31.
In each of these examples, the time at which the state could apply is set firmly in the past from the
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future time set by woll in the matrix clause. This intuition is the result of information provided in
both the sentence and, for (30) and (31), in the context. We have already established that tenses can
be interpreted de re. In a sentence like (27), then, we would expect the embedded PRES to be
interpreted de re such that the sentence can be understood to say that John will believe about our
PRES that Mary loves him in our PRES, but in his PAST, from the perspective of his perceived
now. Similarly, (29) would be understood to say that historians will hold a belief about our PRES
that Biden is president in our PRES, but in their PAST.
Such an interpretation theoretically should be available in all the examples in (27)-(31),
because the embedded PRES can be interpreted de re and these interpretations do not violate the
ULC. Recall that the ULC only restricts the interpretation of tenses such that the attitude cannot be
interpreted as being about a time that follows its local evaluation time. In these examples, the
attitude is about a time that precedes its local evaluation time, and, consequently, the target reading
is not a violation of the ULC. However, these sentences are odd. I therefore believe this data is
indicative that this target de re interpretation of the embedded PRES as PAST is unavailable,
suggesting that the local evaluation time is a lower limit on the constraint of tenses as well as an
upper.
Notice that these examples can be compared analogously to acceptable present-under-past
constructions if the attitude is about an extended time interval that includes the holder’s now as
well as their counterpart of speech time. Consider the following examples in (32)-(34):
(32) a. John will discover that Mary is pregnant.
b. In two months John will discover that Mary is pregnant.
c. In two years John will discover that Mary is pregnant.
(33) John will discover that Mary loves him.
(34) When he talks with her in the mailroom, Bill will learn that Susanna is his
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next-door neighbor.
I have already remarked that the present-under-future construction is distinct from the presentunder-past construction because the present-under-future construction is not limited to the double
access reading. Observe that in all of these examples the SOT reading is available. Note that the
sentence in (32c), however, is one in which the double access reading is unavailable, leaving only
the SOT reading. I previously stated that any context which permits the double access reading
naturally permits the SOT reading as well. (32c) shows that the reverse is not true. That is, any
context which permits the SOT reading does not necessarily permit the double access reading. The
simultaneous reading is simply derived from an SOT rule changing an embedded LF null tense,
either via a deletion or an agreement mechanism, such that it surfaces as an embedded PRES. The
embedded null tense at LF, however, is interpreted as simultaneous with the embedding FUT.
The intuitions in examples (32a)-(32b) and (33)-(34), however, are analogous to the
present-under-past double access readings which is indicative of the availability of the double
access reading in the present-under-future construction. In other words, the attitude in these
examples is about a time interval which includes the attitude holder’s perceived now as well as the
speakers perceived speech time. For that reason, I argue that when embedded under FUT, PRES
has the possibility to access two distinct times: the speech time and the local evaluation time of the
embedding verb. This is parallel to the description typically associated with the double access
reading in the present-under-past construction. I therefore argue that the present-under-future
construction may yield a double access reading.
As I have already observed, the present-under-future double access reading is distinct from
the present-under-past-double access reading. Partly this is the result of the availability of the SOT
reading in the present-under-future construction. It is also the result of the difference in temporal
orientation that results from the embedding verb. Recall that the double access reading in the
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present-under-past construction is constrained by the ULC which stipulates that the local
evaluation time is the upper limit for the interpretation of a tense. In the present-under-future
construction, there can be no violation of the ULC, because the local evaluation time is set by woll
shifting the interval to a future time. So, if the local evaluation time is set in the future, then the
future time becomes the upper limit for the interpretation of PRES, permitting an interpretation
where PRES overlaps the local evaluation time without violating the ULC.
However, we have seen in examples (27)-(31) that the embedded PRES in the presentunder-future construction cannot have a de re interpretation and be understood as PAST. In other
words, the attitude holder cannot be said to be making a claim about a past time or to hold an
attitude that is set in the past. This is distinct from the present-under-past construction. In fact,
these intuitions are opposites to each other: the embedded PRES in the present-under-past
construction cannot be interpreted as FUT, and the embedded PRES in the present-under-future
construction cannot be interpreted as PAST. The local evaluation time as set by the matrix
embedding verb clearly seems to play a role in the temporal orientation that the embedded PRES
has. In other words, I think it is evident that the double access reading requires that the
interpretation of the embedded tense be influenced by its local evaluation time, be it PAST- or
FUT-oriented. This observation is motivation for my proposal for a constraint that suggests the
local evaluation time is not only an upper limit for the interpretation of tenses, but that it is also a
lower limit. I will now turn to proposing this complementary Lower Limit Constraint to account for
the data I have presented in this section.

3.2 The Introduction of the Lower Limit Constraint
Recall that ultimately Abusch developed the ULC in order to prevent the overgeneration of
forward-shifted readings which are intuitively unavailable in English present-under-past
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constructions. If we accept that cases of double access readings are limited to present-under-past
constructions, this singular constraint is sufficient. But as I observed earlier, if the double access
reading is found in present-under-future constructions then Abusch’s proposal cannot account for
all the data I have presented here. Specifically, even with the ULC, the pronominal account,
remains too weak as nothing in the semantics prevents the backward-shifted interpretation of the
embedded PRES, that I highlighted in examples (27)-(31), from arising. However, I have made
clear that these readings are intuitively unavailable. As such the pronominal account needs to be
adjusted to ensure that these readings are prevented. Before we examine the semantics of these
sentences and make the necessary changes to account for this new data, I will repeat the core
definitions of the pronominal account. I have added a definition of FUT to our other tense
definitions, as that is relevant for the new data.
(35) a. Present = ⟦PRESi⟧g is defined iff g(i) ∘ g(0); where defined, ⟦PRESi⟧g = g(i)
b. Past = ⟦PASTi⟧g,c is defined iff g(i) < tc; where defined, ⟦PASTi⟧g,c = g(i)
c. Future = ⟦PRESi woll⟧g is defined iff g(i) ∘ g(0); where defined, ⟦PRESi⟧g =
woll g(i)
(36) The Upper Limit Constraint
The local evaluation time serves as an upper limit for the reference of tenses
such that a tense is only defined if said tense does not strictly follow its local
evaluation time.
Following Abusch (1988), I consider the future tense to essentially be the PRES tense with the
addition of woll that orients PRES such that it may overlap or follow speech time. In addition, there
is the existence and influence of R, the acquaintance relation that helps center an embedded tense
and provides it with access to both its local evaluation time and the matrix evaluation time.
Now, let us consider the example from (33) again with the addition of its LF and truth
conditions presented here as (37):
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(37) a. John will discover that Mary loves him.
b. LF = PRESj,1 woll John discover that [λt2 PRESk,2 Mary love-him]
c. …= Doxj,w*,g(j) ⊆ {⟨w', t'⟩ : ⟦Mary love-him⟧w', R(w',t')(g(k))} as long as g(1) <
g(j) & g(k) ∘ g(1)
d. ∀w∀t∀t'∀R(t ¬< R(w,t)(t'))
Again, we have the ULC from (16b) repeated here in (37d). As a result, what these truth conditions
say is, John’s belief time follows speech time, and for all the world-time pairs in John’s belief state,
the time of Mary loving John holds as long as it does not follow the local evaluation time and
overlaps speech time, denoted by g(1). However, there is nothing in our truth conditions that
ensures that the distinct interval denoted by g(k) overlaps with the local evaluation time. As a
result, there is no way to prevent a reading where the interval specified by g(k) has ended by the
time of the interval denoted by g(j). Our current semantics, then, generates the possibility of g(k) <
g(j) resulting in the reading, “John discovers that Mary loved him”. I have argued, however, that
such readings are intuitively unavailable. Further, I claimed that these sentences have a double
access reading available which yields the intuition that the interval denoted by g(k) is not only
subject to speech time but is also subject to the local evaluation time of the embedded clause. We
therefore need some mechanism or constraint to prevent these readings from generating in our
semantics.
To achieve this, I propose the creation of the Lower Limit Constraint (LLC), defined below,
as a counterpart to Abusch’s ULC.
(38) Lower Limit Constraint
The local evaluation time serves as a lower limit for the reference of tenses
such that a tense is only defined if said tense does not strictly precede its local
evaluation time.
The LLC would serve to ensure that the embedded tense could not completely precede the local
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evaluation time. In doing so, it would prevent unwanted readings like the ones we saw above in
examples (27)-(31). With an active LLC, let us revisit the truth conditions in (37) and observe how
it resolves the problem of overgeneration of unavailable readings.
(37) a. John will discover that Mary loves him.
b. LF = PRESj,1 woll John agree that [λt2 PRESk,2 Mary love-him]
c. …= Doxj,w*,g(j) ⊆ {⟨w', t'⟩ : ⟦Mary love-him⟧w', R(w',t')(g(k))} as long as g(1) <
g(j) & g(k) ∘ g(1)
d. ∀w∀t∀t'∀R(t ¬< R(w,t)(t'))
e. ∀w∀t∀t'∀R(R(w,t)(t') ¬< t)
Now, the LLC is presented in (37e) as an additional constraint on the acquaintance relation, further
limiting the interpretation of the counterpart of g(k). The LLC, in contrast with the ULC, limits this
interpretation such that the counterpart of g(k) cannot precede the local evaluation time. As a result,
we now ensure that the embedded present overlaps both speech time and the local evaluation time.
R is constrained such that the denotation of the counterpart of g(k) is required to overlap with the
local evaluation time, t'. Based on additional conditions from the definition of PRES, g(k) is also
required to overlap speech time, g(1). We successfully prevent a reading where the clause “Mary
loves him” is interpreted as “Mary loved him” at the time of evaluation of John’s discovering. The
LLC, therefore, achieves the goal that we hoped it would. Of course, as with the ULC, the LLC is a
stipulation with, as of now, no independent motivation.
Before I move on and discuss Ogihara and Sharvit (2012), I want to observe that it is
possible to simplify the pronominal account. An account that contains both the ULC and LLC
essentially posits that every tense node carries the presupposition that the interval it denotes
overlaps the local evaluation time. In other words, the designated interval neither completely
precedes nor completely follows the local evaluation time. In this way, the embedded tense,
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regardless of what tense it is, is subject to being constrained by the local evaluation time. This
observation may be defined as the following more general constraint:
(39) General Limit Constraint
The local evaluation time serves as both an upper and lower limit for the
evaluation of tenses such that a tense is only defined if said tense overlaps
the local evaluation time.
This constraint captures the intuition of Bar-Lev that I discussed earlier where a tense interpreted
de re is influenced by local the evaluation time. For Bar-Lev, this is an intuition that is necessary to
predict, and which follows naturally from his definition of tenses as quantifiers over the property of
including the local evaluation time. For my own purposes, I believe the intuition that the local
evaluation time influences the interpretation of a tense is obviously present in the data I submitted.
The GLC is useful for capturing this intuition and ensuring that the semantics does not result in the
overgeneration of unattested interpretation of tenses. Whether we use the simplified General Limit
Constraint, GLC, or a combination of the ULC and LLC, we now have a system in which we are
able to easily derive double access readings in both present-under-past and present-under-future
constructions. For my own purposes I will use the simplified version of the pronominal account
with the GLC, as I believe it is a more economical constraint.

3.3 Data from Ogihara and Sharvit (2012)
In the following section I will discuss the consequences of introducing the GLC into the
pronominal account as well as argue for why I think this extended pronominal account is the
preferable account of the semantics of tense and double access readings. However, before I do so, I
want to revisit the data from Ogihara and Sharvit (2012) that I referred to earlier in the discussion
of double access readings in the present-under-future construction. The following example is (55)
and (56) in Ogihara and Sharvit (2012):
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(40) a. Two months from now, John will tell his mother that he is going to the
Catskills.
b. Two months from now, John will tell his mother that he is going to the
Catskills tomorrow.
Ogihara and Sharvit propose that there are two readings available for the sentence in (40a). The
first reading is the simultaneous reading, which is unproblematic and easily identified. The second
reading is meant to be made salient by the addition of the adverb tomorrow in (40b). This reading
is such that at the future point of John speaking with his mother, he tells her, “Two months ago I
went to the Catskills.” This is the exact reading that I have argued is not available in the presentunder-future construction, however. While Ogihara and Sharvit acknowledge that this reading is
not universally acceptable, they conclude that its availability for some speakers is evidence for the
absence of a lower limit constraint.
As of this thesis, I have no strong comment on why this reading is available to some
speakers. It is not a reading that is intuitively available to me, and it is a reading that I think is not
intuitively available in all present-under-future constructions which I believe is evidenced by the
data I have presented. My initial intuition, then, in questioning why some speakers are able to
derive this reading, is that perhaps the use of the going-to construction as the embedded verb
influences the availability of such a reading. Needless to say, I would like to examine this
potentially problematic data and consider why this reading is available to some speakers in future
work.
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4 Consequences and discussion
Having now presented the expanded pronominal account, I would like to discuss the
following three topics: i) the three major consequences of introducing the GLC and a lower limit
on the interpretation of tenses into the pronominal account, ii) how to save the GLC-based account
from these consequences, iii) why I believe the GLC-based account is the preferable account for
the semantics of tense and double access readings. Following these discussions, I will present my
concluding remarks.

4.1 Consequences and solutions
I have indicated that there are three major consequences to accepting an account with the
GLC and a lower limit on the interpretation of tenses. These consequences concern the loss of the
backward-shifted reading of the past-under-past, past-under-present, and past-under-future
constructions under a de re interpretation. Consider the sentence in (41a), with the LF, truth
conditions, and GLC in (41b), (41c), and (41d), respectively.
(41) a. Bill discovered that Susanna was his neighbor.
b. PASTj,1 Bill discover that [λt2 PASTk,2 Susanna be-his-neighbor]
c. = Doxb,w*,g(j) ⊆ {⟨w', t'⟩ :⟦Susanna be-his-neighbor⟧w', R(w',t')(g(k))} as long as
g(j) < g(1)
d. ∀w∀t∀t'∀R(R(w,t)(t') ∘ t)
Prior to the implementation of the GLC, presented in (41d), there was no issue with deriving the
desired backward-shifted reading. That is to say, without the GLC, there is nothing in the semantics
preventing the interval denoted by g(k) from preceding the local evaluation time, and therefore
from preceding g(j). However, the GLC introduces the additional constraint that g(k) must overlap
the local evaluation time and hence cannot precede g(j). Such a constraint leaves only the
36

simultaneous reading available, as g(k) would be required to overlap g(j). This is naturally not a
desired outcome, as a backward-shifted interpretation of the past-under-past construction is
intuitively available.
The GLC has the same effect on the past-under-present construction as it does on obtaining
the backward-shifted reading of the past-under-past construction. Consider the sentence in (42a),
with the LF, truth conditions, and GLC in (42b), (42c), and (42d) respectively:
(42) a. Bill says that Susanna was his neighbor.
b. PRESj,1 Bill say that [λt2 PASTk,2 Susanna be-his-neighbor]
c. = Doxb,w*,g(j) ⊆ {⟨w', t'⟩ : ⟦Susanna be-his-neighbor⟧w', R(w',t')(g(k))} as long as
g(j) ∘ g(1)
d. ∀w∀t∀t'∀R(R(w,t)(t') ∘ t)
As before, in an account without the GLC, there is no issue with deriving and satisfying these truth
conditions. However, the GLC ensures that the local evaluation time is a lower limit for the
interpretation of a tense, and, as such, the resulting truth conditions would require that g(k) overlap
g(j), rather than precede it, as is desired. By introducing the GLC, we have traded a problem of
overgeneration for one of undergeneration: to capture the finding that double access readings
constrain the way that present-under-future constructions are interpreted, we have made it
impossible to derive back-shifting de re.
These consequences are not insignificant and may lead to us considering discarding an
account of tense that involves the GLC and a lower limit. Instead of jumping to this conclusion,
however, I think it is worthwhile to consider an alternative way to view back-shifting. I have thus
far assumed that tenses in English could only be either pronominal or quantificational. I have not
considered the possibility that English could have both pronominal and quantificational tenses. If
we are open to this possibility we might ask, should all instances of back-shifting be treated as
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pronominal? If the possibility that English could have both a pronominal and quantificational
PAST is unacceptable, and if we assume for the moment that tenses in English are only pronominal
then the data I have presented in (41)-(42) are clear counterexamples to the GLC. We therefore
would have to conclude that the expanded pronominal account with the GLC is incorrect. If,
however, we are open to the possibility that the English PAST may be both pronominal and
quantificational then there remains an opportunity to save the expanded pronominal account and
the GLC.
Consider the following example in (43), adapted from Stowell’s (2014) (22):
(43) Max said that Peter was angry, and Mary will too.
This example permits a reading where the back-shifting in the antecedent and in the elided VP
point to different times. This is unexpected under either the ULC-based pronominal account or the
GLC-based pronominal account on the basis of the conditions required for ellipsis data. Ellipsis
readings require the elided material to be semantically identical to the material that is overtly
present at PF. In a pronominal account this would require each embedded PAST to have the same
index. But matching indices would result in each embedded PAST referring to the same time which
would be set by the context, so the reading where the back-shifting in the antecedent and the elided
VP point to different times should be unavailable. However, this reading clearly is intuitively
available. This must mean that the embedded PAST has quantificational readings, as Stowell
himself suggested. With this possibility, we can keep the pronominal and GLC account, because
not all cases of embedded PAST are cases where the PAST is pronominal.
Consider the truth conditions of (43) presented in (44a) and (44b) where (44a) presents the
truth conditions of the first expression in (43), “Max said that Peter was angry,” and (44b) presents
the truth conditions of the second expression, “Mary will say that Peter was angry too.”
(44) a. [λt . Doxm,w*,t ⊆ {⟨w,t'⟩ : ⟦Peter be-angry⟧w,R(w,t')(g(k)) & R(w,t')(g(k)) < t'}]
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b. [λt . Doxm,w*,t ⊆ {⟨w,t''⟩ : ⟦Peter be-angry⟧w, R(w,t')(g(j)) & R(w,t')(g(j)) < t''}]
Notice, that neither the ULC nor GLC are not necessary for the point to be made about this
example; if the occurrence of PAST is pronominal and if ellipsis requires semantic identity
between the two VPs, then the embedded PASTs in each VP must be coreferential. But on the
interpretation of (44), where the intended reading is that each occurrence of PAST points to a
different time, this does not hold. However, if we adjust the truth conditions to include the
indefinite PAST, we are able to avoid violating the semantic identity requirement of ellipsis.
Consider (45) below:
(45) a. [λt . Doxm,w*,t ⊆ {⟨w,t'⟩ : ∃t''[t'' < t' & ⟦Peter be-angry⟧w,t'']}]
b. [λt . Doxm,w*,t ⊆ {⟨w,t'⟩ : ∃t''[t'' < t' & ⟦Peter be-angry⟧w,t'']}]
From these truth conditions, we can now see that the overt material at PF is identical to the elided
material. We are therefore able to maintain semantic identity and derive the correct interpretation
where the back-shifting in the antecedent and in the elided VP point to distinct times. We now have
strong evidence that even in a pronominal account of tense, an indefinite English PAST is required.
I introduced this section by noting the expanded pronominal account with the GLC and a
lower limit for the interpretation of tenses has serious consequences for the backward-shifted
interpretation of the past-under-past, past-under-present, and past-under-future constructions. With
the proposal of an indefinite PAST, based on this data from Stowell (2014), however, these
concerns are resolved. In each of these cases we may assume the embedded PAST is the indefinite
PAST which permits the derivation of the backward-shifted reading while preserving the GLC. In
addition, in Ogihara and Sharvit (2012) they discuss the possibility that Japanese has both
pronominal and quantificational tenses. With crosslinguistic support of both pronominal and
quantificational tenses, the claim that the English pronominal PAST has a quantificational
counterpart is perhaps less extreme. I would therefore argue for the inclusion of an indefinite
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PAST.
With this evidence supporting a view that even a pronominal account requires an indefinite
PAST in English, I propose the following definition of a simple quantificational PAST:
(46) ⟦PAST⟧g,c = [λt'i . λp⟨i,t⟩ . ∃t''[t'' < t' & p(w,t'')=1]
This indefinite definition of PAST differs from Bar-Lev’s revised quantificational definitions and
is instead in line with traditional definitions of quantificational tenses. It is entirely possible,
however, that Bar-Lev’s definition for an indefinite PAST is preferable. Contrary to the pronominal
account, the target reading of the example from Stowell (2014) in (43) is not problematic for BarLev’s quantificational account. One could interpret this example, then, as evidence that the
quantificational approach to tense is the correct one. Before we accept that conclusion over a
pronominal account with an indefinite PAST, however, there are two an additional readings of (43)
that are available, that contain further insights on the interpretation of tenses in ellipsis contexts.
The first of these readings is one where the antecedent VP and the elided VP are both
interpreted as simultaneous each with its respective embedding verb. This reading is represented in
(47) below, and is based on Stowell’s (20a):
(47) Max saidt1 that Peter wast1 angry, and Mary will sayt2 that Peter ist2 too.
The sentence in (47) is a nonissue for all the accounts I have been discussing. That is, Abusch’s
pronominal account, my extended pronominal account, and Bar-Lev’s quantificational account all
are able to derive the correct truth conditions for (47) without difficulty. From the perspective of
the pronominal accounts, the interpretation of (47) simply involves an SOT rule which results in
each expression being interpreted as simultaneous. Under Bar-Lev’s account, the embedded tense
in each sentence can undergo QR to be interpreted as simultaneous with identical truth conditions
in both the overt and elided VP such that semantic identity is preserved and requirements for
ellipsis interpretation are satisfied.
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The remaining reading is more complicated, however. This reading is one where the
antecedent VP is interpreted as simultaneous with its embedding verb, and the embedded tense in
the elided VP is also interpreted as simultaneous with the antecedent. This reading is presented in
(48) below, and is adapted from Stowell (20b):
(48) Max saidt1 that Peter wast1 angry, and Mary will sayt2 that Peter wast1 too.
As far as the pronominal account is concerned deriving the correct reading and matching semantic
identity between the overt and elided VPs is not impossible. The embedded PAST in each sentence
will have identical indices resulting in reference to the same time as well as satisfying the required
semantic identity condition for ellipsis. However, under a pronominal account with the GLC and a
lower limit for the interpretation of tenses this interpretation should not be possible. The
interpretation of second expression under the English FUT should be ruled out because the
embedded tense is understood to not overlap speech time.
I have already established why the introduction of the indefinite past in the pronominal
account is necessary. Unfortunately, even with this addition, my extended pronominal account
cannot provide the correct truth conditions for the example in (48). In order to have semantic
identity, each expression would need to embed the same PAST, either indefinite or pronominal. If
we embed a pronominal PAST, the GLC is violated and the interpretation of sentence should be
expected to fail, contrary to the data. However, if we embed a quantificational PAST, the
consequence is the loss of the simultaneous reading in the first expression. This sentence in (48),
therefore, remains a challenge to my extended pronominal account. So, of the two pronominal
accounts, only Abusch’s ULC-based account is successful in accounting for this example.
As far as Bar-Lev’s quantificational account is concerned, the example in (48) is
problematic as well. In order to obtain the simultaneous interpretation in the first expression, under
Bar-Lev’s account the embedded tense must undergo quantifier raising. Per the rules and
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expectations of ellipsis, this move results in the requirement that the embedded tense in the second
expression also raises. It is expected in ellipsis contexts that, in order to preserve semantic identity,
the scope of the quantifier in each expression must match. That is, it cannot be the case that in one
expression the quantifier takes wide scope while in the other expression the quantifier has a narrow
scope. In Bar-Lev’s account, this would be equivalent to suggesting that we cannot interpret one
tense as de re, and having it undergo quantifier raising, while we interpret the other tense as de
dicto, and thus having it be interpreted in-situ. Therefore, in both expressions the embedded tense
must undergo quantifier raising, or the requirements of ellipsis would rule out the sentence
altogether.
However, there is a cost to having both tenses undergo quantifier raising. Namely, the result
is that Mary would have to have an opinion about a time that includes our past and her now. Let us
examine the truth conditions in (49) to make this claim more obvious:
(49) b. = ∃t[∃t'[t* ⊆ t' & t < t' & ∃t''[∃t'''[t* ⊆ t''' & t''' < t''] & ∀⟨w,tw⟩ ∈ DoxM(w*,
t'') : Peter be-angry in w at t'''' s.t. t'''' ⊆ tw & t'''' = t]]]
To make this simpler to view I have limited the truth conditions to that of the second expression
involving Mary, but I will note that the VPs are semantically identical, and that requirement of
ellipsis is, therefore, of no concern. I have also underlined the relevant parts of the truth conditions.
What the truth conditions here require, then, is for Mary to hold an opinion about a time t'''', such
that the state of Peter being angry is true at this time, and that this time must include the local
evaluation time and be equal to a time t, which represents our past time since it falls before t' which
denotes an interval that includes our speech time. This would imply that Mary’s ability to interpret
time is seriously flawed, however, as it would require her to have an opinion about a time that both
includes her future evaluation time and our past. As such, while Bar-Lev’s account satisfies the
requirements of ellipsis, it fails in providing a reasonable interpretation of the embedded tense in
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the second expression. We may therefore conclude that Bar-Lev’s quantificational account
struggles to easily explain the example in (48).
The sentence in (48), then, can only be easily accounted for by Abusch’s ULC-based
pronominal account. The example otherwise proves to be difficult for both my extended
pronominal account and for Bar-lev’s quantificational account. It consequently becomes necessary
for me and for Bar-Lev to explain why this example of ellipsis data is unique or why we might
have reason to discard it. Alternatively, if I found another way to derive the correct reading without
violating the GLC and while maintaining semantic identity, or if Bar-Lev were able to explain
Mary’s erroneous belief or eliminate it from the truth conditions, either account may have an
additional advantage. None of these tasks are straightforward or trivial, however, Therefore, as of
now, however, Abusch’s account maintains the advantage of accounting for the example in (48).
In spite of this counterexample to my account, however, I would not wish to neglect the
motivations that led to proposing it in the first place. Based on the data I presented earlier in (27)(31), there is good reason to believe that the ULC-based account is insufficient. With the data we
have seen in this section, specifically the first reading I highlighted for the sentence in (43), I
believe there is good reason to conclude that English contains both a pronominal and an indefinite
PAST. My expanded pronominal account will therefore assume the inclusion of the indefinite
PAST in its semantics. In the following section I will argue for why I think my expanded
pronominal account is preferable to either Abusch’s ULC-based account or to Bar-Lev’s
quantificational account.

4.2 Discussion
I have now presented Abusch’s original pronominal account, Bar-Lev’s quantificational
account, and my expanded pronominal account. There are valid critiques for each account, but I
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intend to explain why my proposal is preferable to the other two. I will begin first with Bar-Lev’s
quantificational account. One benefit of Bar-Lev’s account is that his proposal neatly captures both
the ULC and the LLC without needing to stipulate the constraints. In this way his account has the
advantage of naturally capturing the intuition that the local evaluation time influences the
interpretation of the embedded tense.
However, his account is less appealing in that it involves the stipulation that the embedded
PRES must raise in order to be interpreted. This is a concerning stipulation because it involves a
nonstandard justification for quantifier raising as there is no type-mismatch and no independent
motivation from res movement to account for the forced raising. In addition, this stipulation results
in nonuniform scope behavior of the embedded PRES and PAST. In his account, the embedded
PRES is required to raise and take a higher scope, given that no purely relative interpretations of
the English PRES are attested. The embedded PAST on other hand is not required to take a higher
scope, and as a result, the account has the two tense morphemes differing in how each takes scope.
With this difference, the quantificational account loses the advantage of claiming uniformity
between its tenses.
Given these concerns, we may therefore conclude that a pronominal account is perhaps a
better approach to the semantics of tense and the double access reading. The primary critique of the
pronominal account, which is true of either Abusch’s account or my extended pronominal account,
is that the constraints of the ULC and the GLC are stipulated. That is, these constraints lack
independent motivation to justify their existence as part of the system. I cannot argue against this
fact. However, I think it is clear that even Bar-Lev’s quantificational account involves stipulation. I
would suggest that the stipulation behind the GLC is preferable to the stipulation that the embedded
PRES must undergo quantifier raising to be interpreted given the consequences that result from this
stipulation.
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In comparing Abusch’s pronominal account and my extended pronominal account, as of
now there is only one significant difference between the two. Under Abusch’s account the only
constraint is that of the ULC which states that the local evaluation time is an upper limit for the
interpretation of tenses. My account, on the other hand, posits the GLC, which states that the local
evaluation time is both an upper and a lower limit for the interpretation of tenses. In this way my
account is more restrictive than that of Abusch. I believe this is a beneficial aspect of my account. I
argue that the GLC captures the intuition that the local evaluation time influences the interpretation
of an embedded tense, an intuition with which Bar-Lev and the quantificational account would
agree, given his promotion of the Inclusion Generalization.
The restrictive nature of my account with the GLC also resolves Bar-Lev’s complaint
regarding the ULC being too weak. Bar-Lev argued that because the ULC only restricts future
interpretations of tenses interpreted de re, it permits readings that involve both a simultaneous and
backward-shifted interpretations of an embedded PAST. Recall that he makes this criticism on the
basis of the example in (19), repeated below:
(19) Every doctor thought Mary was pregnant.
Bar-Lev argued that this mixed reading is the result of individuals in a given context being
permitted to each have their own acquaintance relation to distinct times from the perspective of the
embedding past marked attitude verb. This results in some of the individuals interpreting the
embedded PAST as being simultaneous with the attitude verb, while others will have a back-shifted
interpretation. However, under my account, the interpretation of the embedded PAST is restricted
and, as a result, this mixed functional reading is prevented. With the GLC in place, and with the
possibility of SOT and an indefinite PAST, there are three possible readings available. The first
reading is the result of SOT, and it results in a simultaneous interpretation. The second reading we
expect to be available is one with an embedded indefinite PAST which results in the backward45

shifted reading. Recall that deriving the backward-shifted reading was initially a concern for the
GLC account, but the introduction of the indefinite PAST resolved this consequence. We therefore
have successfully derived the two acceptable readings for the sentence in (19).
Let us consider the unavailable “mixed” reading of (19). Under the GLC system, both a
forward and a backward perspective from everybody’s collective attitude time is prevented. The
GLC requires that the interpretation of the embedded tense overlap the local evaluation time. In
this case, that would entail that the interpretation of the embedded PAST must overlap the
collective perceived “now” and everybody would have to agree on the interval that the embedded
PAST denoted. In other words, the GLC would predict only a simultaneous interpretation of the
embedded PAST. In addition, it is not possible to mix any of these methods of deriving a reading to
produce the mixed interpretation. The sentence must either be interpreted with SOT, or with the
indefinite, or as de re constrained by the GLC. The mixed reading is therefore no longer predicted
resolving Bar-Lev’s critique and providing another advantage of the expanded pronominal account
over Abusch’s account.
I also suggested that Abusch’s account was not restrictive enough because it could not
account for the data I presented in (27)-(31). This is a similar concern to that of Bar-Lev even
though we focused on different constructions. The concern that led me to propose the extended
pronominal account was specifically that there was nothing in the semantics preventing the
embedded PRES in the present-under-future construction from being interpreted as backwardshifted. I do not believe these readings are attested in English, and so I believe an account that
prevents them is required. With the inclusion of the GLC which designates the local evaluation
time as both an upper limit and a lower limit for the interpretation of tenses, I believe this goal is
achieved.
Naturally, my account is not without its own flaws, some of which are quite concerning at
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first consideration. I introduced the indefinite PAST to resolve the loss of the backward-shifted de
re interpretation of the past-under-past, past-under-present, and past-under-future constructions.
With the inclusion of the indefinite PAST, there remains only the sentence in (48) as a significant
counterexample to my expanded pronominal account. But, as I have observed, the consequences of
Bar-Lev’s stipulation regarding the embedded PRES and the readings that Abusch and the ULC
cannot account for, give my expanded pronominal account an advantage. I would therefore submit
that the expanded pronominal account, with both the GLC and indefinite PAST is the preferable
account for the semantics of tense and the double access reading in English, but I leave it to the
reader to decide if they agree.
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5 Concluding remarks
I have argued throughout this thesis for a reexamination of tense semantics and the double
access reading in English. Specifically, I argued that the double access reading is not limited to the
present-under-past construction, but rather can also be found in the present-under-future
construction. I made this proposal on the basis of conditions that give rise to the double access
reading that I laid out in section 2.1. However, I noted that the double access reading in the presentunder-future construction is distinct from the present-under-past construction in that the presentunder-future construction is not limited to the double access reading. For the present-under-future
construction, any context wherein the double access reading is licensed, the simultaneous reading is
necessarily also licensed. This is a crucial difference between the interpretation of the presentunder-future and present-under-past double access readings.
As a result of this difference and some data of the English present-under-future construction
that showed the embedded PRES cannot be understood as PAST under a de re interpretation, I
argued that the pronominal account needed to be expanded to include a lower limit for the
interpretation of tenses. I simplified this proposal by creating the General Limit Constraint which
predicts that the local evaluation time is both an upper and a lower limit for the interpretation of a
de re interpreted tense. Introducing such a proposal was not without consequences. Of particular
concern was the loss of the backward-shifted interpretation in the past-under-past, past-underpresent, and past-under-future constructions. However, I highlighted an example from Stowell
(2014) that provided strong evidence to include an indefinite PAST in the pronominal account.
With this indefinite PAST, the concerns regarding the loss of the backward-shifted interpretations
were resolved.
In addition, I presented two additional accounts of tense, specifically Abusch’s (1997)
ULC-based pronominal account and Bar-Lev’s (2015) quantificational account. At the end of the
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last section, I argued for why my extended GLC pronominal account was the preferable account
between the three proposals. I suggested this because there are serious consequences to Bar-Lev’s
stipulation that the embedded PRES must undergo quantifier raising to the matrix level. Bar-Lev’s
stipulation is not motivated by traditional methods, such as type mismatch, nor is it motivated by
res movement. Instead, it is driven by lexical interpretation, which is a previously unattested cause
for quantifier raising. This stipulation of movement to matrix level is the only part of Bar-Lev’s
semantics that prevents the semantics from generating a purely relative interpretation of the
embedded PRES in the present-under-past construction.
Abusch’s account, on the other hand, proves to be too weak, both in past-under-past
constructions, as noted by Bar-Lev, and in present-under-future constructions. In both cases
Abusch’s ULC account permits readings in the semantics which are unavailable. My extended
pronominal account, however, that posits that the local evaluation time is a lower limit, in addition
to being an upper limit for the interpretation of tenses, does prevent the semantics from generating
these readings. Additionally, in contrast to Abusch’s account, my proposal captures the intuition
that the local evaluation time overlaps the interval denoted by the embedded tense. For these
reasons I have proposed that my account captures the necessary intuitions associated with the
double access reading with a few key advantages over the other two accounts.
Of course, there remains much work to be done regarding my proposal. Perhaps the most
important step is to look at what cross-linguistic data can reveal about my account. It is vital to
determine if my extended pronominal account applies in languages other than English and I would
be curious to see if my proposal can help further explain cross-linguistic variations in tense
semantics. In addition, in my thesis I briefly touched on, but did not explore in depth, the account
proposed by Gennari (2003). I think Gennari poses an interesting suggestion, specifically in that
she claims the double access reading is the result of tense semantics combined with some
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pragmatic mechanism. In this way she posits that the double access reading is similar to so-called
revisionist beliefs (see e.g., Blumberg and Lederman 2020). I think the intuition at play in this
claim is very subtle and difficult to test empirically. However, I would further explore such a
proposal to see if there is anything that revised beliefs could tell us about double access readings.
I also have noted in my thesis two potential counterexamples to my account and the GLC.
The first is the example from Ogihara and Sharvit (2012) involving the “going-to” construction
embedded under a future-marked attitude verb. I would like to further examine this construction to
determine why some speakers find it acceptable to interpret the embedded PRES as PAST. The
other example I discussed is the Stowell (2014) sentence involving ellipsis data and a past-underfuture construction that cannot be the indefinite PAST. On the basis of this counterexample, I
would like to further work with ellipsis data to determine what is unique about this case that it can
violate the GLC, or to determine how to preserve the GLC while maintaining semantic identity.
Finally, I would like to look at the effect that the embedding verb seems to have on the
acceptability of the double access sentence. It is certainly true that in the present-under-past
construction some attitude verbs are better than others when it comes to acceptability of the double
access reading. Consider the examples below:
(50) ?John believed that Mary loves him.
(51) ?John thought that Mary loves him.
(52) John said that Mary loves him.
(53) John discovered that Mary loves him.
It is clear that the attitude verb plays a significant role in the acceptability of the double access
reading in the present-under-past construction. It is interesting to note that the verbs that appear to
be unacceptable at first, become more acceptable when preceded by the verb “seemed to.” Klecha
(2016) began work on this question of the effect of the embedding verb, speculating that it is the
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modal base of the verb that influences its acceptability as well as whether or not the ULC applies. I
believe, however, there is much more work to be done on the question of embedding verbs and that
this work would be valuable in furthering our understanding of tense and its behavior at the
syntax/semantic interface.
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